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Human Rights in Policing – The Past, Present and Future  
Sarah Poolman, Richard Wilshaw, Jamie Grace 
 
Abstract 
This article seeks to demonstrate, largely from practitioners' perspectives, the growing 
evolution in understanding and implementation of meaningful human rights standards within 
the policing context. In the early 2000s, 'human rights' were perceived and treated as a 
rather restrictive framework in UK policing. They are now more readily seen as a set of tools 
that guide and help the police to balance the views and interests of all parties to the criminal 
justice process. Human rights values enable police in the UK to better endeavour to do the 
right thing, 'without fear or favour'. 
 Keywords:  
Evolution in application of HRA to operational policing, balancing of competing rights, duty to 
protect the most vulnerable,  human rights and the policing of protest and public order. 
 
Introduction 
This Special Issue has been issued to mark seventy years of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). This declaration laid the foundation for future, binding human rights 
treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), made directly legally 
enforceable in the UK through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Since the HRA came into 
force in October 2000, it has acted increasingly as the touchstone for UK policing.  
Twenty years on, in the context of the debate over calls for the HRA to be replaced by a 
British Bill of Rights,1 and with the backdrop, at the time of writing, of the imminent departure 
of the UK from the EU (and the Charter of Fundamental Rights promulgated by the latter),2 it 
is timely for us to ask: has the HRA achieved its objective, and secured better enforcement 
of and respect for ECHR rights?  
By asking ourselves this question, we are also inevitably determining how well UK policing 
enforces, upholds and respects the text of the UDHR: many of the ECHR rights we discuss 
in this piece, in relation to operational policing, are found described in the earlier UDHR. 
Article 10 ECHR, the right to freedom of expression, has as its parallel article 19 UDHR; 
while article 11 ECHR, the right to freedom of association, is contained in article 20 UDHR. 
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To assess the success of the HRA in the policing context, we have plotted its impact on 
policing over the last twenty years. We consider the challenges and also the learning and 
opportunities that have presented themselves and that have, we feel, enabled the police to 
become far more sophisticated and professional in their understanding and application of 
human rights standards.  
Back in 2000, the significant challenge of training approximately 140,000 police officers 
nationwide on what is a complex piece of legislation was delivered through primarily e-
learning approaches, and the distribution of aide-memoires. This equipped officers with little 
more than a cursory knowledge of the key articles, with limited understanding of the 
subtleties of the interplay between articles of the ECHR. In hindsight, the subsequent  lack of 
in-depth knowledge and cognisance of competing rights was a significant shortcomingof the 
approach taken at that time, given that policing rarely enables any single element of the 
ECHR to be considered in isolation. This complexity can be summarised for the purposes of 
this article as the following three elements: balance, obligations, and flexibility. 
Our professional context 
Operational policing almost without exception entails and has always entailed a process of 
decision-making; the change now is that this is undertaken in a human rights-conscious 
manner, which is structured around the need to balance ECHR rights against one another. 
This means on the one hand taking into account the right(s) of offenders or suspects that are 
primarily interfered with by policing activity, tactics or strategies. On the other hand, the 
police must consider the rights of victims and wider members of the public affected, whom 
the police seek to safeguard.  
Added to this initial consideration is the nuance of any relevant police positive obligation to 
uphold fundamental rights. In other words, the police, like most public bodies, have duties to 
ensure that fundamental rights are effectively secured for and enjoyed by citizens. This 
obligation contrasts with a more traditional negative obligation—that is, the obligation to 
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simply abstain from unnecessarily interfering with human rights through to committing 
human rights violations. 
Another complexity is the principle that the ECHR is not meant to result in a complete 
consistency in the manner in which policing respects human rights from one European 
jurisdiction to the next: the European Court of Human Rights allows for some flexibility 
(known as the 'margin of appreciation') from one country to the next on a similar issue. 
Such complexities lead to practical and logistical challenge when training vast numbers of 
police officers and staff; however, in the early 2000s, other obstacles hindered the 
wholehearted implementation of the HRA. Although many frequently refer to the ‘the Police’ 
as an institution, it is primarily a collective of police officers as individuals and as teams of 
colleagues, some of whom are inevitably resistant to change. Such individual resistance, in 
conjunction with the limited training that failed to dispel media-driven myths about the ECHR 
being a ‘criminals charter’3, resulted in limited credibility for a human rights agenda. This, in 
turn, impacted on police understanding and, consequently, ensured a limited  initial impact of 
ECHR standards on everyday approaches in policing.  
Yet, before we are too disparaging about the police understanding and application in the 
early 2000s, it is only fair to point out that, at that stage, the HRA was, in some respects, 
setting up a 'blank canvas' for policing in the UK. There was little case law that was at that 
time familiar or relevant enough to police commanders on the scope and operation of ECHR 
rights, which could be deployed easily in professional development terms, or more 
meaningfully as a framework in operational decision-making contexts. The lack of 
widespread knowledge of and application of human rights case law meant there was little to 
assist those on the policing frontline to make tough decisions in often very tight timescales.   
This position did not last long. Soon there were a number of tragic incidents where police 
action or inaction brought section 6 of the HRA firmly into focus. Section 6 states:’It is 
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unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’, 
where ‘”An act” includes a failure to act’. 
High profile murders, such as that of Victoria Climbié in 2000 and those of Julia and William 
Pemberton in Hermitage in 2003, brought into sharp focus the positive obligation under 
article 2 ECHR for public authorities to protect the fundamental right to life. State agencies, 
including the police, were criticised following these murders for failing to protect the lives of 
vulnerable people suffering abuse in terms of their actions prior to the death and at the time 
of death. In both cases, inquiries subsequently found that public agencies were aware that 
there had been a significant risk of death but did not take sufficient steps to protect the 
victims.4    
Such high-profile cases made it clear that the police could potentially be held in violation of 




Yet ensuring that a citizen’s article 2 rights are protected is just one example of the complex 
balancing act the police are continually undertaking. In almost every situation where 
someone’s right to life is threatened by another person, the police officers involved have  an 
operational requirement to consider and balance this threat to life, against the rights of the 
suspected party (in particular, that individual’s article 5 (liberty) and article 8 (privacy) rights). 
). This perpetual balancing act is the core human rights challenge in operational policing. It is 
never black and white.  
In both spontaneous and planned firearms operations, and in threat to life and public order 
operations, police commanders have no option but to rely on an incomplete intelligence 
picture. Commanders must then make reasonable assumptions in order to assess the threat 
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to a member of the public and decide on a course of policing action that is both proportionate 
and necessary and in line with any competing rights under the ECHR.   
The police force’s positive duty to protect  the most vulnerable 
The high-profile tragedies of the 2000s drove the growing awareness and application of the 
ECHR within policing, and as a resultembedded improvements in the police service. For 
example, in-depth training on the HRA is now provided as part of leadership courses. In 
addition,national human rights-cognisant standards for firearms operations and threat to life 
situations were produced and operationalised, with a focus on being proactive in the 
protection of life.   
Various tragic cases have also prompted legislative and policy changes to assist the police 
in fulfilling their positive obligation under article 2 ECHR, and in protecting the lives of 
vulnerable victims. The introduction of the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSODS), 
known as 'Sarah’s Law', in 2010, and the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS), 
known as 'Clare’s Law', in 2012, and Domestic Violence Protection Notices/Orders in 2015, 
have further strengthened the procedural focus on human rights and in particular on the right 
to life, with a greater emphasis than ever before on the need to be proactive in policing with 
the purpose of protecting vulnerable victims from harm. These schemes are not without their 
limitations and there is a genuine concern from pressure groups and academics, for 
example, that victims of domestic violence who receive a disclosure are often framed as 
individuals who can, as a result, make 'more informed choices' about their relationships—
leading to an accusation in some quarters that Clare's Law is to an extent 'victim blaming'.5 
However, the reality is that a disclosure under either the ‘right to ask’ (where potential victims 
approach the police) or the ‘right to know’ (where the police make proactive disclosures) is 
intended to assist the victim by providing facts about a partner’s past and is rarely, if ever, 
the only intervention undertaken by police and partners to support victims. Other forms of 
intervention include the embedded Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) 
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framework and commissioned Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVA)services 
countrywide.  
This positive obligation to protect the Article 2 and 3 rights of victims of serious harm was 
further strengthened by the Supreme Court in the spring of 2018 in the case of the 
Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis vs DSD and another.6 This case relates to an 
appeal by the police against the judgment in the case of DSD where victims of John 
Worboys (the 'Black Cab Rapist') had been awarded damages for the breach of their Article 
3 rights. Article 3 states that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ The sexual offences committed by Worboys on his 
victims amounted to Article 3 violations. The contested issue raised by the Metropolitan 
police was whether the positive obligation under Article 3 extended beyond systemic failures 
to operational and investigative ones. The Supreme Court found that there were sufficiently 
serious investigative failings that the claimants should be afforded a remedy against the 
Metropolitan Police, in the form of damages, in this particular case. The Supreme Court 
observed that in the cases concerned there were failures to record information in reports of 
crimes; failures to promptly interview witnesses; failures to collect CCTV evidence (from a 
police station no less!); and failures to link complaints from multiples victims to one man. 
Lord Kerr stated that ‘failure in investigations, provided that they are sufficiently serious, will 
give rise to liability on the part of the police’.  
Although the Worboys case relates to offending between 2003 and 2008, it does make clear 
to the police now and in the future that they could be liable if 'egregious' failings in 
investigations result in further victims coming to serious harm. Judgements like this that 
provide greater clarity on public authority obligations will inevitably put an extra demand on 
the police and quite rightly encourage us to be more proactive around protecting the 
absolute rights within the HRA. Police forces, as a result of other serious case reviews and 
learning, have and continue to invest more resources in specialist units trained to deal with 
sexual offending and vulnerable victims, as well as greater investment in units to detect 
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online sexual offending. In the current climate, there is daily emphasis on mitigating threat 
and risk, and in doing so, we seek to protect victims from serious harm. Although there are 
pressures on police resources, those serious crimes will always be prioritised and so, the 
impact of these judgments and the resourcing challenge is far more likely to impact on our 
response to offences at the lower end of the criminal spectrum.  
Encouragingly for police commanders, the balancing of competing rights when there is a 
credible threat to life or serious offence is a relatively straightforward. Quite rightly, the 
fundamental right to life takes precedence and will often easily justify the interference in the 
limited or qualified rights of any suspected parties, such as the right to freedom of 
expression or the right to privacy. This ‘weighing up’ becomes more challenging when we 
move into the public order arena, the policing of events and protests, where there is no 
precise threat to life and where the rights of opposing and wider groups are of equal status 
within the HRA. This is where both shifts in relevant case law, and the concerted effort by 
the police to improve and evaluate their proper understanding of the ECHR, has enabled a 
seismic change in the professionalism of the policing response to protest and public order. .  
Human rights and the policing of public order and protest 
Back in 2001, the only reference made to the HRA in a personal safety manual issued to all 
officers involved in public order policing operations was in relation to the use of force and of 
searches. The decision-making/ briefing model to be followed by commanders responsible 
for public order operations was, at the time, known as IIMARC (Intention, Intelligence, 
Method, Administration, Risk and Communications) and, with the advent of the HRA coming 
into force, an 'H' for 'human rights' was simply added at the end to create the IIMARCH tool. 
Many documents and operation orders at this time concluded with the line ‘This document is 
ECHR compliant’ without any further analysis or reference to human rights within the policy 
or operational order itself. We might now consider this approach to be a sign of the 
complacency or lack of understanding of the ECHR, or perhaps both.  Looking back, with 
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2019 eyes, and with the benefit of established HRA training and an embedded decision-
making model (the National Decision Making model, or NDM) in which the HRA is integral, it 
is hard to believe that the then-established model, IIMARCH, was so fundamentally flawed: 
with both Risk and Human Rights identified for consideration after the Method was to be 
identified (i.e. the tactics and resourcing) and suggesting, in effect, that the policing 
approach concerning a public protest had already been decided.  
Whilst progress was made through the 2000s, the policing of public order changed 
fundamentally as a result of the 2009 G20 Protests in London. The policing of these protests 
received widespread media coverage in relation to the unlawful death of Ian Tomlinson, the 
use of the tactic of ‘kettling’ and theuse of excessive force by the police. By November of the 
same year, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) had published their guide on 
Adapting to Protest – Nurturing the British Model of Policing, in which HMIC acknowledged 
the complex and forever-changing legal picture in relation to public order policing but also 
noted that: 
‘Of particular concern is the low level of understanding of the human rights 
obligations of the police under the Human Rights Act 1998. It is hard to overestimate 
the importance for officers to understand the law when each individual police officer 
is legally accountable for exercising their police powers, most particularly the use of 
force.’7  
Amongst the recommendations, HMIC stated that the starting point for the planning of public 
order operations by police commanders was the presumption, out of respect for the ECHR 
rights to both freedom of expression (article 10) and freedom of association (article 11), in 
favour of peaceful protests in public places. As a result, in response to Adapting to Protest, 
the national public order command training programme was completely and rapidly rewritten, 
with the key change being the inclusion of dedicated lessons on 'Human Rights and the Use 
of Force'. These lessons focussed on the qualified rights of articles 9 (freedom of religion), 
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10, and 11 ECHR and the 'Ten Key Principles Governing the Use of Force by the Police' 
published by HMIC.8 With the rollout of this new command training to both new and existing 
commanders at tactical and strategic levels (i.e. across the levels of the relevant police 
Bronze, Silver and Gold Commanders), there is no doubt that this led to a substantial 
improvement in commanders' knowledge of the combined 'Right to Protest'.  
However, whether intentional or not, this heavy focus on articles 9, 10 and 11 in isolation 
from the rest of the articles of the ECHR did potentially elevate the importance of these 
'protest rights' to an almost-absolute status. What the training used at the time, we feel, 
failed to cover was Article 17 ECHR, and its 'Prohibition of Abuse of Rights':  
‘Nothing in the convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.’  
Had there been a healthier focus on article 17 ECHR, and the linked concept of the need to 
balance the rights of protestors with a positive obligation to protect the equally-important 
rights of members of the public and of communities, commanders might have had a clearer 
view of what could/should be regarded as lawful and ‘peaceful protest’. Direct action by 
demonstrators aimed at preventing the lawful activities of members of the public or of 
businesses could have been viewed as an act aimed at the destruction of rights and 
freedoms of others and would have been an approach that assisted commanders in more 
thoroughly balancing the rights of all interested parties. The correct (albeit complex) and 
current position has been best summarised, in our view, by Mr Justice Males in a case 
concerning injunctions brought against demonstrators interfering with the destruction of trees 
in Sheffield by a contractor employed by the local authority. Mr Justice Males in Sheffield 
City Council v Alice Fairhill and others (2017)9 noted, at paragraph 88, that:  
‘the lawfulness of a protest may change with time. In some circumstances it will be 
impossible to justify a restriction on freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful 
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assembly which is of limited duration, even if it involves conduct which is tortious or 
which amounts to a criminal offence, and even if the conduct in question affects 
adversely the rights of others or – as in this case – prevents others from going about 
their lawful business. That is something which public authorities and others may have 
to put up with in view of the importance of these rights in a democratic society. 
However, a protest which starts as a legitimate exercise of Article 10 or 11 rights may 
become unlawful if it continues for a more extended period. The more serious the 
tortious or criminal conduct in question and the greater the impact on the rights of 
others, the shorter the period is likely to be before the initially legitimate protest 
becomes unlawful. Similarly, there is a distinction between a protest which is aimed 
at requiring a public authority, particularly an authority which is democratically 
accountable, to think again about a controversial decision and a protest which seeks 
to prevent such an authority from implementing a lawful decision reached and 
maintained after extensive debate.’  
An earlier focus by the police on article 17 would have helped to add the necessary nuance 
to the ‘presumption in favour of peaceful protests’. Instead, this presumption—particularly 
following the ruling of the unlawful death of Ian Tomlinson—resulted in a climate in which, for 
some time thereafter, the police continued to ‘facilitate’ problematic and impactful protests. 
The fact that the police placed too much focus on the rights to assemble and express views 
in a public arena has led to criticism from groups in the wider community that protests were 
‘allowed’ which they perceived to be interfering with their own rights. Police commanders all 
too often have not challenged this position of 'facilitation' and perhaps did not feel easily 
empowered to do so, until the fairly recent case of R (DB) v Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (2017),10 in which the wider community challenged the policing of marches in Belfast 
and demanded that their article 8 rights (privacy, right to a home) were recognised and 
protected. Article 8 was engaged because the homes of individuals on the parade route 
were damaged. Lord Kerr stated in his precis of the case that:  
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‘the police wrongly believed that they were obliged by Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to facilitate protests, even 
if they are technically illegal. To the contrary. . . They had an inescapable duty to 
prevent where possible what were plainly illegal parades and to protect those whose 
rights under Article 8 of the convention were being infringed.’  
The DB case of 2017 has served as a catalyst for police forces to recognise and fulfil their 
positive obligations to protect the rights of others/ the wider community and not just to 
protect the rights of protestors. Police forces have begun to rely more on article 17 ECHR 
and to undertake a more nuanced balancing of rights, which sometimes justifies greater 
interference with the rights of the protestors. What has emerged is a distinct move away 
from the 2009 position of simply ‘facilitating peaceful protest’;the police must show no ‘fear 
or favour’ and now carefully balance the rights of not only the protest and counter-protest 
groups, but also those of the general public affected.  
We must be mindful, too, that changing technologies used in policing represent fresh human 
rights challenges. The use of an algorithmic database and risk-scoring system known as the 
Gangs Matrix by the Metropolitan Police was deemed unlawful by the Information 
Commissioner's Office in November 2018. An Enforcement Notice was issued to the effect 
that the Gangs Matrix was in breach of several data protection principles, which arepart of 
the framework of UK privacy law and linked to the protection offered by article 8 ECHR and 
the respect it requires for private and family life. Elizabeth Denham, UK Information 
Commissioner, observed that: 
‘My investigation revealed serious breaches of data protection laws with the potential 
to cause damage and distress to the disproportionate number of young, black men 
on the Matrix. For me it comes back to fairness; how people – both alleged gang 
members and alleged victims - end up on the matrix, how their personal data is 
shared, and whether that is done appropriately. What my investigation revealed was 
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serious breaches of data protection laws with the potential to cause damage and 
distress to those on the matrix. Ignoring people’s fundamental data rights erodes 
trust and confidence, which risks alienating the communities the Met serves. Building 
trust with communities to tackle gang crime comes from people knowing that 
engaging with the police will not have adverse consequences. Knowing that their 
personal information will not be shared unnecessarily, knowing that their chances of 
getting housing or a job will not be damaged, and knowing that they have won’t be 
discriminated against, simply because they’ve included in the Matrix.’11 
Conclusion 
In the twenty years since Royal Assent for the HRA, the police’s attitude towards the HRA 
has evolved dramatically from one of limited understanding to a position where, in our force, 
the HRA features in every decision made at every level of the organisation, from call 
handlers through to Gold Commander. There will, of course, be regional and individual 
variations in the understanding and application of the HRA and, as we are human beings 
who are asked to do a very difficult job with frequently only seconds to make decisions, 
mistakes will still be made. However, as the last twenty years have shown us, it is these 
mistakes and evolution in understanding of the HRA that has enabled the vast progress 
made. Sometimes the police have been known to falter in their procedural respect for human 
rights, but increasingly human rights values have taken the centre ground in UK policing. In 
a substantive sense, UK police officers should now be recognised for the human rights 
actors that they are. This is not the case in much of the media coverage of UK policing 
where failures are (sometimes rightly) lambasted and too often dwelt upon. Statements 
made by Non-Governmental Organisations also tend to focus entirely on the way police 
forces allegedly breach human rights and rarely recognise the hard graft on human rights 
issues that the police do every day in this country.  
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There are many challenges that the police service continue to face in 2019, summarised in 
the recent Home Affairs Select Committee report ‘Policing for the Future’.12 It is the 
combination of the reduction in police officers with growing demand that poses a significant 
challenge for us.  However, what our better understanding of the HRA enables us to do is to 
be more effective at identifying and responding to those incidents where the threat is the 
greatest and where we need to perform our core role—to protect life. The HRA acts as a 
moral compass and helps us to steer our way through both fast-time situations where there 
is a threat to life and slower-time investigative or public order dilemmas, where there is no 
obvious right or wrong. It is clear that some of this change has been thrust upon the police 
through tragedy and rightful criticism, but of equal importance in this journey is the 
willingness and professionalism of those working within the police service to embrace the 
HRA and seek to apply it so that its original purpose is achieved. This entails better 
enforcement of ECHR rights for all individuals affected by UK policing and ongoing support 
of the principles contained in the UDHR. The UDHR may be non-binding in law, but it 
contains values with which police leadership and policing policy can be framed and 
developed.  
 
Please note that the views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not of their 
Police Service.  
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